# 1NC---NU Opener---Round 2

## 1NC

### T

#### Interpretation---the resolution should define the division of aff and neg ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research

#### The USfg means the three branches

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Fairness---the Neg should win on average 50% of the time---any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose---their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash---debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third- and fourth-line responses---that’s key to effective politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs---their interpretation explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### Case

#### Big Tech rising now---contained antitrust is key.

Rob Lever 8-15. Writer at TechXPlore. Big Tech rolls on as investors shrug off regulatory pressure. No Publication. 8-15-2021. https://techxplore.com/news/2021-08-big-tech-investors-regulatory-pressure.html

Pressure is rising on Big Tech firms, signaling tougher regulation in Washington and elsewhere that could lead to the breakup of the largest platforms. But you'd hardly know by looking at their share prices.

Shares in Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Google parent Alphabet have hovered near record highs in recent weeks, lifted by pandemic-fueled surges in sales and profits that have helped the big firms extend their dominance of key economic sectors.

The Biden administration has given signs of more aggressive regulation with appointments of Big Tech critics at the Federal Trade Commission.

But that has failed to dent the momentum of the largest tech firms, despite tough talk and antitrust litigation in the United States and Europe, with US lawmakers eyeing moves to make antitrust enforcement easier.

Big Tech critics in the United States and the EU want Apple and Google to loosen the grip of their online app marketplaces; more competition in a digital advertising market dominated by Google and Facebook; and better access to Amazon's e-commerce platform by third-party sellers.

One lawsuit tossed out by a judge but in the process of being refiled could force Facebook to spin off its Instagram and WhatsApp platforms, and some activists and lawmakers are pressing for breakups of the four tech giants.

All four have hit market valuations above $1 trillion, with Apple over $2 trillion. Alphabet shares are up some 80 percent from a year ago, with Facebook up nearly 40 percent and Apple almost 30 percent. Amazon shares are roughly on par with last year's level after breaking records in July.

Microsoft, with a $2 trillion valuation, has largely escaped antitrust scrutiny, even as it has benefitted from the cloud computing trend.

The surging growth has stoked complaints that the strongest firms are extending their dominance and squeezing out rivals.

Yet analysts say any aggressive actions, in the legal or legislative arena, could take years to play out and face challenges.

Fast-moving environment

"Breakup is going to be nearly impossible," said analyst Daniel Newman at Futurum Research, citing the need for controversial legislative changes to antitrust laws.

Newman said a more likely outcome would be multibillion-dollar fines that the companies could easily absorb as they adjust their business models to adapt to problematic issues in a fast-moving environment.

"These companies have more resources and know-how than the regulators," he said.

Dan Ives at Wedbush Securities said any antitrust action would likely require legislative change—unlikely with a divided Congress.

"Until investors start to see some consensus on where the regulatory and law changes go from an antitrust perspective, it's a contained risk, and they see a green light to buy tech," he said.

#### Expanded antitrust causes a wave of additional expansions---tanks current Big Tech innovation and economic output.

Wayne Brough 6-15. Policy Director at R-Street, Technology & Innovation. Washington wants to weaponize antitrust law to attack “Big Tech” and it is going to backfire horribly. R Street. 6-15-2021. https://www.rstreet.org/2021/06/15/washington-wants-to-weaponize-antitrust-law-to-attack-big-tech-and-it-is-going-to-backfire-horribly/

Solutions in Search of a Problem

As with many other regulatory incursions into the digital world, the renewed push for tougher antitrust laws is a solution in search of a problem. Both Republican and Democratic criticisms of Big Tech raise a litany of issues—from an anti-conservative bias to fake news and hate speech—none of which fall within the purview of antitrust law and anticompetitive behavior. Instead, the new regulatory regime under consideration is a punitive and political attack on politically disfavored corporations. Ultimately, that is the larger battle—abandoning the consumer welfare standard and its focus on demonstrable consumer harm in favor of a politicized regime that allows those in Congress greater control over private companies.

And while tech companies may be the exclusive focus of the current reforms, the scope of the proposed legislation could easily be expanded by a future Congress. Even today, many lawmakers are openly hostile toward a growing list of American businesses. Republicans have been vocal in calling for retaliatory measures against “woke” corporations deemed too progressive in their public stances. If policymakers continue to abandon economic principles, it would not be surprising to see calls for additional antitrust enforcement for any company that makes political waves.

Prior to the adoption of the consumer welfare standard almost 50 years ago, antitrust law was often confusing, economically suspect and even contradictory. In one notorious case, the Supreme Court blocked a merger where the merged company would have had a market share of merely 7.5 percent—hardly an example of market dominance. And economists examining antitrust enforcement prior to the consumer welfare standard found no correlation between antitrust enforcement and a reduction in the welfare losses from monopoly. Further research found congressional influence to be a better predictor of enforcement activity.

The consumer welfare standard helped rationalize antitrust enforcement and the case law that has emerged since its adoption has helped curb the political abuse of antitrust policies. Abandoning the need to identify demonstrable consumer harm would return antitrust law to an era characterized by arbitrary enforcement actions that many in today’s Congress seem to have forgotten. But the increased political oversight that comes with adopting more aggressive tools for antitrust enforcement poses a real threat to consumers, to innovation and to economic growth.

Abandoning the American Way in Favor of a European One

The bills introduced in the House can be interpreted as a turn toward a European approach to competition policy. Last year, the EU passed the Digital Markets Act, and the House proposals sound eerily similar. The EU started by defining “gatekeepers,” something similar to the “covered platforms” in the House bills. Restrictions on self-preferencing, interoperability requirements and other elements introduced in the House all have direct counterparts in the EU’s law.

The EU adopted its laws with a clear target in mind—American tech companies that were dominating markets in Europe and outperforming their European rivals. Politically, it made sense to rewrite the rules of the game in favor of homegrown talent. Among other things, this meant the EU could collect billion-dollar fines from American companies, all in the name of “fair competition.”

But the performance of European companies is probably the best reason not to follow the EU’s lead in redefining how we regulate competition. By virtually every measure, U.S. companies have been more innovative, more dynamic and more profitable than their European counterparts. There are more start-ups in the United States and they have greater access to capital. While the United States and the EU have economies of similar magnitudes, in 2019, U.S. startups had a valuation of $1.37 trillion compared to EU startups with an evaluation of $240 billion.

The rise of Silicon Valley is an American success story. Today the top five companies in the United States based on market capitalization are tech companies. They have led the digital revolution, providing consumers a virtually endless stream of new products at low or even zero cost in many cases. These are signs of a robust market that serves consumers well. It is important to remember that big does not equate to bad—sometimes a firm is large because it is efficient at serving its customers what they want. The tech sector supports 12 million jobs and more than $2 trillion in economic output. Current antitrust laws grounded in the consumer welfare standard are part of the institutional framework that make this possible. Congress should ensure antitrust laws fit best into the modern U.S. economy, but the House proposals are a radical departure that shifts the focus to protecting competitors rather than consumers. They would weaponize antitrust law, provide politicians a greater say in America’s boardrooms and replace economic efficiency with political expediency and preference.

#### Wrecks international competitiveness.

Robert D. Atkinson and Michael Lind 18. president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. visiting professor at the University of Texas Johnson School of Public Affairs. Commentary: Who Wins After U.S. Antitrust Regulators Attack? China. Fortune. 3-29-2018. https://fortune.com/2018/03/29/commentary-who-wins-after-u-s-antitrust-regulators-attack-china/

Unfortunately, this kind of reverse industrial policy in the name of antitrust continues. In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission required that the semiconductor maker NXP divest its RF (radio frequency) power business as a condition for its $11.8 billion acquisition of U.S.-based Freescale Semiconductor Ltd. While this was done with a focus on the consumer, it opened up the business for acquisition by the Chinese investment company Jianguang Asset Management Co. Ltd., which has financial backing from the Chinese government. Just like that, thanks to an action undertaken by the U.S. government, critical U.S. technology capabilities went to China.

The lesson from this tale of unintended consequences for current antitrust enforcement is clear: It is time to stop ignoring potential adverse consequences of U.S. antitrust policy for America’s international competitiveness. Antitrust policies may be justified in terms of limiting anti-competitive behavior that hurts other firms in the U.S. economy. But when antitrust judgments weaken U.S. firms, allowing foreign firms and nations to free-ride on American R&D in order to catch up with and sometimes eliminate entire U.S. firms and industries, the result is to enrich other countries at America’s expense.

Maintaining American technological primacy in key industries should be a key consideration of U.S. antitrust policy—not just reducing concentration ratios in particular industries. The Justice Department and FTC appear to have little interest or capacity to consider the effects of their actions on U.S. international competitiveness. Going forward, when they decide to take action affecting a leading U.S. innovation-based firm, experts on the broader national interest in maintaining global competitiveness should have a seat at the table.

It is time for antitrust policy regarding firms in advanced technology industries to be carried out in coordination with the Commerce Department. The alternative is to allow antitrust actions, which are supposed to benefit all Americans, to backfire by helping foreign rivals bring American firms and industries down.

#### US-China competition isn’t defined by military strength, but relative innovation capacity---outpacing China is the only way to prevent a war

James Lewis 18. Senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Technological Competition and China.” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/technological-competition-and-china>.

The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions.

The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace.

Innovation has become a central element of its international influence. This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership.

Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.

#### Chinese technological rise is demonstrably worse---causes global instability and conflict

Alan W. Dowd 21. Senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. "Capstones: China’s Dream, the World’s Nightmare – Sagamore Institute". No Publication. 4-5-2021. https://sagamoreinstitute.org/capstones-chinas-dream-the-worlds-nightmare/

If China is indeed the future, if China is primed to “rule the world,” if China remakes the international order in its image, it won’t be pretty. A future dominated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be demonstrably worse than the world we know. Just look at how Xi Jinping’s regime treats its own subjects—and plays its current role on the global stage.

NO RIGHTS

Those predictions aren’t outlandish. China already is the world’s top manufacturing nation, top exporting nation and second-largest economy. The PRC was the only major economy to emerge from 2020 claiming GDP growth (if we are to trust Beijing’s books). In the pandemic’s wake, China dislodged the U.S. as the world’s primary destination for foreign direct investment. PRC-backed firms are leaders in the global 5G and AI race. On the strength of a 517-percent binge in military spending since 2000, China bristles with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, deploys a high-tech air force, has a growing and openly hostile presence in space, is doubling its nuclear arsenal, and boasts a 350-ship navy (now the world’s largest). Beijing’s growing cultural reach is evident in everything from its influence over Hollywood, to its puppet-master relationship with the NBA, to its 480 Confucius Institutes (designated by Washington as “part of the Chinese Communist Party’s global influence and propaganda apparatus”).

As President Joe Biden concludes, China is “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

Xi is doing exactly that. But the China challenge starts inside the PRC.

Xi is pursuing what he calls the “China Dream,” which enfolds goals such as sustained economic development, military power modeled after and matching that of the U.S., ideological conformity, “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “complete unification of our country.” Making Xi’s “China Dream” come true is turning into a nightmare for his subjects.

Before leaving his State Department post, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described what Xi is doing to Uighur Muslims as “genocide,” noting that Beijing has “forced more than a million people into internment camps in the Xinjiang region” and detailing “torture, sexual abuse…rape, forced labor…and unexplained deaths in custody.” As he took the baton from Pompeo, Secretary of State Antony Blinken agreed, affirming that “The forcing of men, women and children into concentration camps, trying to, in effect, re-educate them to be adherents to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide.”

The U.S. government isn’t alone. The Uighur Muslim region, according to a UN human-rights watchdog, “resembles a massive internment camp…a no-rights zone.” More accurately, all of China is a no-rights zone.

Xi’s China is a place where Christian churches are smashed and followers of Christ are sent to reeducation camps; Buddhist temples are bulldozed; Uighur men are packed into freight trains, Uighur women are forcibly sterilized and Uighur babies are forcibly aborted; and bishops and Nobel Peace Prize laureates die in prison. Under Xi, “Religious persecution has increased…with four communities in particular experiencing a downturn in conditions—Protestant Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and both Hui and Uighur Muslims,” Freedom House reports. Amnesty International adds that “hundreds of thousands of people” are subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention in China, many of them for “peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of belief.”

There’s a brutal logic to Xi’s brutal response to religious activity. The common denominator of most every religion is that there’s something above, something beyond, something bigger, more enduring and more important than the state. That notion represents a mortal threat to the legitimacy and durability of Xi’s regime, which is founded on the premise that people exist to serve the state—not to use their God-given gifts to serve others and God.

Xi’s capacity to control is growing ever more insidious. The PRC’s new “social credit system” is using mega-databases to monitor and catalogue every aspect of life of China’s 1.3 billion people—financial transactions, civil infractions, social-media postings, online activity—and then reward or sanction Xi’s subjects by feeding all that information to the National Development and Reform Commission, banking system and judicial system. PRC subjects with good social credit scores enjoy waived fees, lower utility bills, promotions and expedited overseas-travel approval, while those with poor social credit scores can be fired from their jobs, expelled from school, blocked from universities, or barred from accessing transportation.

An Orwellian surveillance state, more than a billion people denied religious freedom and other human rights, uncounted numbers tortured in reeducation camps, physicians jailed for following the Hippocratic Oath—that’s the kind of future and the kind of world Xi wants to build. As dissident leader Xu Zhangrun observed in the wake of Beijing’s criminal mishandling of COVID-19, “A polity that is blatantly incapable of treating its own people properly can hardly be expected to treat the rest of the world well.”

NO LIMITS

That idea—the notion that the PRC is incapable of treating the world any better than it treats its own—is not particularly profound. After all, this is a regime that over the decades has erased some 35 million of its subjects and tortured millions more. Regimes like this see no limits on their power. Since they believe nothing is above the state, they rationalize everything they do in the name of the state, the revolution, the Supreme Leader, the Dear Leader, the Core Leader (Xi’s new title). With no moral constraints on what they do, they believe their ends always justify their means.

That backwards worldview informs every aspect of decision-making in the PRC. This doesn’t mean Washington should refuse to talk with Beijing. But we must be ever vigilant when dealing with Xi. A regime that can justify imprisoning, torturing and killing its own people for peacefully practicing their faith can and will justify anything: seizing foreign lands, annexing international waterways, absorbing free peoples, stealing proprietary information, leveraging a pandemic to gain geopolitical advantage, breaking treaties. The godless USSR did those sorts of things, and so has the godless PRC.

“It is difficult to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country,” President Ronald Reagan said of the USSR, “can be trusted to keep agreements with others.” And here we are yet again.

Experts in policy analysis, academia and military-security affairs conclude that Xi’s response to COVID-19 “was in breach of international law.” It pays to recall that COVID-19 was a local public-health problem that metastasized into a global pandemic due to Beijing’s incompetence or intention (either cause is reason not to entrust the future to Xi); that Xi’s regime lied about human-to-human transmission; that Xi’s regime willfully allowed millions to leave the epicenter in Wuhan for destinations around the world; that Xi’s regime carried out a premeditated plan to hoard 2.5 billion pieces of protective equipment as the virus swept the globe; that Xi’s regime blocked scientists from sharing findings about genome sequencing for weeks; that Xi’s regime continues to refuse to cooperate with international health agencies.

Xi’s intervention in Hong Kong and assertion of rule by remote-control is a brazen violation of an international treaty.

In and above the East China Sea, Beijing is constantly violating Japanese airspace and illegally loitering PRC coast guard vessels in Japanese waters. All the while, Beijing illegally claims some 90 percent of the South China Sea. Xi has backed up those claims by building 3,200 acres of illegal islands beyond PRC waters. These islands feature SAM batteries and warplanes. Xi promised the PRC wouldn’t militarize these islands. But as America and its allies learned at enormous cost last century, words don’t matter to men like Xi. Strength and the will to wield it are all that matters. Xi has both.

His goal is to control the resource-rich South and East China Seas, assert sovereignty claims in fait accompli fashion, and bring Chinese-speaking lands under his heel. Hong Kong—where only PRC-approved “patriots” are allowed to serve in government—was his first objective. Taiwan is next. Xi has made clear that democratic Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed by the communist Mainland. “We make no promise to abandon the use of force,” he warns. That explains Beijing’s ground-unit exercises, naval drills and bomber sorties around the island democracy.

Nor are Xi’s dreams and designs limited to his immediate neighborhood. Beijing is buying loyalty via development projects (see the Belt and Road Initiative), gaining a toehold in strategically located regions (see PRC control over ports in 18 countries), building an authoritarian bloc (see Russia, Serbia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela), and fielding a power-projecting military capable of challenging the Free World across every region and every domain—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Xi’s relentless cybersiege of the Free World is siphoning away inventions, discoveries, technologies and wealth, penetrating defense firms, and interfering in elections.

For those with eyes to see—who know about the laogai camps and brutalization of Muslims and oppression of Tibet and assault on Christianity—none of this comes as a surprise. What’s surprising is that for 40 years, the trade über alles caucus convinced itself that such a regime could somehow be reformed by access to Buicks and Kentucky Fried Chicken.

TAKING AIM

Xi vows to build what he calls “a more just and reasonable new world order”—one that would supplant the liberal democratic order the United States and its allies began building after World War II. Importantly, the PRC not only has the intent to build a new world order; it has the resources and capabilities to do so—which helps explain why those who designed and uphold the existing world order are answering China’s challenge.

The PRC is a country of 1.3 billion people. Its GDP is already $14.1 trillion. Its economic tendrils—trade, banking, manufacturing, logistics, shipping, technology, super-computing, artificial intelligence—stretch into every part of the globe. All of this is fueling the PRC’s relentless military modernization and buildup. The PRC’s annual military expenditure is at least $261 billion. (Beijing recently announced an increase in military spending of 6.8 percent for 2021). The PRC has a 2-million-man military, the world’s largest navy and an intense focus on its neighborhood.

None of this would be a particularly worrisome if China embraced the values of liberal democracy—the rule of law, individual freedom, religious liberty, free enterprise and free trade, majority rule with minority rights. These are the foundation stones of what Churchill and FDR envisioned when they drafted the Atlantic Charter in 1941. Their vision led to what some call the “rules-based democratic order,” others the “liberal international order,” still others the “free world order.” These terms aim to describe how the peoples of the West have tried to make the world work and indeed manage the world: They embraced and encouraged democratic governance; developed rules and norms of behavior; promoted liberal (freedom-oriented) political and economic institutions; and called upon governments to live up to the responsibilities of nationhood by respecting international borders and promoting good order within those borders. The result has been an unparalleled spread of prosperity, an unprecedented expansion of free government and an unexpected remission of great-power war (which had become an increasingly-destructive feature of the centuries leading up to 1945).

To be sure, many regimes reject the values of liberal democracy. But the PRC, like the USSR before it, not only rejects those values; it possesses the military-technological-industrial-economic assets to challenge those values, erode the liberal international order built upon those values, and forge a new international order or at least bend the existing order toward its own goals. But don’t take my word for it.

“Some seek to challenge the international order—that is, the rules, values and institutions that reduce conflict and make cooperation possible among nations,” Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warn, pointedly adding that “China in particular is all too willing to use coercion to get its way.”

Former national security advisor Gen H.R. McMaster concludes that PRC “leaders believe they have a narrow window of strategic opportunity to…revise the international order in their favor.”

Before he retired as Indo-Pacific commander ,Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Xi and his lieutenants are “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order.”

A NATO panel noted late last year that Beijing’s “approach to human rights and international law challenges the fundamental premise of a rules-based international order.”

These political, diplomatic and military leaders recognize that the liberal order has promoted the peace and prosperity of the Free World for nearly 75 years. But it doesn’t run on autopilot. If we want the benefits of a liberal order that sustains our way of life, we need to sustain the liberal order. As Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution observes, “The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.” He adds, “Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers, and every international order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests.”

Indeed, the liberal order and its guarantors have arrived at a turning point or breaking point: Either they will marshal the means and will to update, strengthen and preserve the existing order, or Beijing will dramatically transform it. Xi’s callous treatment of his own subjects and contempt for international norms offer a glimpse of what his “more reasonable new world order” would look like.

#### The most comprehensive studies prove that financialization has heterogenous economic impacts---it strengthens developing economies and can’t individually tank developed economies.

Agne Setikiene and Mindaugas Butkus 21. Institute of Regional Development, Vilnius University Siauliai Academy. Associated Professor / Senior Researcher at the Institute of Regional Development. “The Heterogeneous Impact of Financialisation on Economic Growth in the Long Run” *Journal of Risk and Financial Management*, 14(5), 209. https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/14/5/209/htm

The study results show that more developed countries, regardless of their institutional quality, most likely experience a negative effect of financialisation on long-run economic growth. However, in countries with a lower level of development, we, in the majority of cases, find a statistically significant positive effect. The fact that the effect of financialisation, mediated by institutional quality, level of development, and interaction using the same proxies, differs across countries, shows that the effect on long-run growth is heterogeneous and depends on variables used to proxy the country’s development level and institutional quality. This finding, to some extent, explains the ambiguous conclusions of previous research.

4. Conclusions

Though there have been many attempts to study the relationship between financialisation and economic growth, this study contributes to the literature by examining the heterogeneous impact of financialisation on long-run economic growth. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other study in which the effect of financialisation on economic growth is examined by considering two simultaneous mediators and their interaction.

This study contributes to the methodological approaches used to estimate the effect of financialisation by augmenting a traditional model with a three-way multiplicative term. Contrary to previous research, which only allowed to estimate the effect of the financialisation on growth directly in different groups of countries, this study contributes to the direct estimation of the variability of the financialisation, which depends on the factors that could mediate the effect of financialisation. The suggested specification of the model and the computation of conditional standard errors could contribute to the analysis of any mediating factor.

Aiming to evaluate the heterogeneous effect of financialisation on long-run economic growth and by computing the conditional marginal effects and their standard errors, we showed that it is possible to find the positive and negative as well as significant and insignificant effect of financialisation in different countries.

The findings of the research support the view that the impact of financialisation on long-run economic growth is heterogeneous. In addition, we find evidence that the source of heterogeneity is the country’s development level and institutional quality, which work simultaneously. Using different combinations of proxies for institutional quality and level of development, we found that more developed countries, regardless of their institutional quality, experience a negative effect of financialisation on long-run economic growth. If investments are directed to stock markets to profit and create shareholder value, resources are shifted from the manufacturing sector to the financial sector, which has a negative impact on economic growth. Contrary, in countries with a lower development level, a positive and statistically significant effect was found. Since credit is channelled to investment in the service sector or the real sector to improve productivity and quality, the financial sector, by providing new opportunities for savers and investors, stimulates economic growth. In many cases, in relatively less-developed countries, the effect of financialisation, mediated by the interaction between secondary school enrollment or tertiary school enrollment and institutional quality indicators, is insignificant. The country’s level of development likely has a stronger impact on the effect of financialisation on economic growth than institutional quality. However, this study did not intend to investigate which factor has a stronger mediating effect on the financialisation-growth nexus. Moreover, including other variables of financialisation and other mediating factors could be considered as the scope for further research.

The results of this paper point out some policy recommendations. For developing countries, financialisation can be a driving force for economic growth. It is more common in countries with a lower development level to find a positive and statistically significant effect of financialisation, which is mediated by the interaction between the size of the service sector and institutional quality. Thus, it is important to allocate financial resources properly and direct investment to the service sector to stimulate its growth. In developed countries, financialisation has a positive effect on long-run economic growth only when it is driven by the interaction of secondary school enrollment and voice and accountability. Thus, for developed countries, other sources of heterogeneity that could reduce the negative effects of financialisation on economic growth should be sought.

#### Cap’s sustainable---solves resource scarcity and climate change.

Rainer Zitelmann 21. German historian and author of “The Rich in Public Opinion.” "Consumption Presumption: Are Human Beings Destroying the World?" National Interest. 2-12-2021. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/consumption-presumption-are-human-beings-destroying-world-178114

Some people claim that we need to cut our consumption or there will be no hope for the planet. Such claims are based on the thesis that continued growth increases the rate at which the earth’s finite resources are consumed and, moreover, leads to irreversible climate change. And such warnings are by no means new. In 1970, for instance, the Club of Rome attracted a great deal of attention with the publication of The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, which has to date sold more than thirty million copies in thirty languages. The book warned people to change their ways and had a clear message: the world’s raw materials, and in particular, oil would soon be used up. In twenty years, the scientists predicted, we would have used the very last drop of oil. Of course, the Club of Rome’s models for the depletion of oil—and almost all other major raw materials—were wrong. According to the scenarios presented in The Limits to Growth, we should now be living on a planet that has been devoid of natural gas, copper, lead, aluminum and tungsten for decades. And we were supposed to have run out of silver in 1985. Despite the bleak forecasts, as of January 2020, the United States Geological Survey estimated silver reserves worldwide at 560,000 tons.

More from Less

Employing an extensive array of data, the American scientist Andrew McAfee proves in his book More from Less that economic growth is no longer coupled to the consumption of raw materials. Data for the United States, for example, show that of seventy-two resources, from aluminum to zinc, only six are not yet post-peak. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the U.S. economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually decreasing.

Back in 2015, the American environmental scientist Jesse Ausubel wrote an essay, “The Return of Nature: How Technology Liberates the Environment,” showing that Americans are consuming fewer and fewer raw materials per capita. Total consumption of steel, copper, fertilizer, wood and paper, which had previously always risen in line with economic growth, had plateaued and was now in constant decline.

Such across-the-board reductions in natural resource consumption are only possible because of much-maligned capitalism: companies are constantly developing more efficient production methods and reducing the amount of raw materials they consume. Of course, they are not doing this primarily to protect the environment but to cut costs.

What's more, a constant stream of innovations has promoted the trend of miniaturization or dematerialization. Just think of your smartphone. How many devices has your smartphone replaced and how many raw materials did they use to consume?

Calculator

Telephone

Video camera

Alarm clock

Voice recorder

Navigation system

Camera

CD-player/radio

Compass

Nowadays, many people no longer have a fax machine or street atlas because they have everything they need on their smartphone. Some even use their phones instead of a wristwatch. You used to need four separate microphones in your telephone, cassette recorder, Dictaphone and video camera, today you just need one—in your smartphone.

Fighting climate change with nuclear energy

The finite nature of the world’s natural resources is one argument against growth, climate change is another. Let’s take China as an example: China currently emits more CO2 than any other country in the world and is building a number of new nuclear power plants in order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. With the new build program well underway, China’s first new-generation nuclear power plant recently went into operation.

In the very near future, China intends to start exporting power plants. The latest generation of nuclear power plants is much safer than earlier models—and can play a pivotal role in the fight against climate change. In the United States, Joe Biden is already evaluating the advantages of small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power plants. As the name suggests, SMRs are smaller than traditional nuclear fission reactors and offer a maximum capacity of three hundred megawatts. In the United Kingdom, for example, a consortium led by Rolls-Royce has announced plans to build up to sixteen SMR power plants.

So far, two reactors of this type are in operation, both onboard the floating nuclear power plant  “\Akademik Lomonosov, which supplies heat and electricity to the Siberian city of Pevec and its one hundred thousand inhabitants.

Anticapitalists blame capitalism for resource consumption and climate change. But political decisions—such as Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy—frequently have a negative impact on climate change.

Telling people to cut their consumption must seem like pure mockery to the hundreds of millions of people around the world who are still living in extreme poverty. What they need is more capitalism and economic growth. Just like in China, where the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 percent in 1981 to less than 1 percent today. Andrew McAfee’s book has an optimistic message about how we don't have to turn back the clocks and cut our consumption: capitalism and technological progress are allowing us to steward the world’s resources, rather than stripping them bare.

#### Venture capital investments prove---funding into climate tech has grown almost 4000 percent since 2013.

Grace O'Donnell 21. Assistant editor for Yahoo Finance and a UX writer for Yahoo products. "Climate tech: How ESG investing is evolving into ‘a profitable endeavor’." Yahoo Finance. 8-19-2021. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/climate-tech-esg-investing-profitable-endeavor-191604271.html

\*Chart in the original article omitted

As economies across the globe square up to the challenge of slowing human-caused global warming, venture capital firms hope to tackle climate change without repeating the mistakes of a decade ago.

“I think some of the extreme weather events are making some things a little more apparent to people," Mike Winterfield, founder and managing partner of Active Impact Investments, said on Yahoo Finance Live (video above). “But I think the second thing that's happened is it moved from, say, a group of do-gooders and concerned environmentalists to people who were serious about business and wanted to leverage capitalism sincerely in a way to make this a profitable endeavor, and I think that's when it dragged investors in.”

Venture capital-backed climate tech companies have raised $14.2 billion worldwide in 2021 as of June 25, according to PitchBook data. That builds on a years-long wave: Between 2013 and 2019, according to PwC, worldwide annual venture capital funding into climate tech grew 3,750% in absolute terms, which was three times the growth rate of VC investment into artificial intelligence over that time period.

[chart omitted]

The general trend is also positive: Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has become a major secular theme across assets overall as investors adopt the framework for everything from stocks to the CLO markets.

“I think there's just a lot of tailwinds for the space,” Winterfield said. “This is where the talent wants to work, when you look at millennials. This is where the regulations are going. This is where consumer behavior and preferences are changing. This is where investor money is flooding. So I would expect in the next 10 years that sustainability will become sort of a big go-to and big growth and performance space in investing.”

Is climate tech the new clean tech?

This isn't the first time there have been high expectations for companies looking to tackle some of the world's most difficult problems such as facilitating the energy transition, revolutionizing agriculture, and finding alternatives to the world's appetite for plastic.

Between 2006-2011, Silicon Valley VC firms — fueled by rising fossil fuel prices, energy legislation, and increased consumer awareness of climate change — poured $25 billion into the clean tech sector. By 2011, over half of that amount was lost, and the number of new clean tech companies in subsequent years diminished substantially.

The boom and bust of clean tech has made investors question whether climate tech will be any different.

That said, there are a few key areas where climate tech differs. One area is climate tech's singular focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions across economies. In other words, while clean tech primarily dealt with the environmental impacts of the energy sector, climate tech is aiming to solve the main driver of climate change in all sectors.

Climate tech has primarily gravitated toward transport and mobility, according to PwC's annual climate tech report, with 63% of investment going to that sector. So while the energy sector produces far more global emissions, it has received less VC funding as more mature technologies like solar and wind are being financed in other ways.

Another major tailwind for climate tech this time around is support from consumers and governments, which lagged a decade ago.

“The need is bigger and more urgent than it has ever been before, and [so is] people's understanding of that," Winterfield said.

Consumers willing to vote with their dollar have enabled startups like Beyond Meat (BYND) to reach multi-billion-dollar valuations. That consumer demand has bolstered investors' confidence and has drawn talent to the innovative tech companies, Winterfield noted.

“What we're seeing with a lot of the companies that we're investing in and that others are investing in in the space right now is that they're already proving to perform,” he said. “They're reaching high levels of profitability, cash flow. We're seeing acquisitions, IPOs happening in the space, and investors are getting rewarded for moving into the space right now, and the level of talent and innovation that is moving into the space is absolutely astounding.”

A growing political will to act on climate change has also spurred cautious optimism. While Winterfield said that President Biden's recent actions on climate, as well as those taken in Canada, showed “a ton of promising steps in the right direction,” investors have reason to be wary of government-led climate action.

“I think it is the responsibility of the companies that we invest in to have a model that allows them to be profitable even without government intervention,” Winterfield said. “The government intervention that has hurt us in the past at times has been essentially funding industries that are causing the problem. So you have money coming out of both pockets.”

#### Eroding financial resilience causes war---that overcomes traditional barriers to conflict

Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov 19. Former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War.” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/>.

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war.

Crisis responses limited

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates.

But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms.

Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy.

From bust to bubble

Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression.

As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy.

The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign.

International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition!

Liberalization’s discontents

Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened.

Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization.

Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality.

To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries.

Insecurity, populism, conflict

Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern.

Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts.

Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse.

At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies.

Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg

Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers.

They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta!

Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

#### Those wars draw-in great powers---that outweighs

Lawrence H. Summers 17. US Secretary of the Treasury (1999-2001) and Director of the US National Economic Council (2009-2010), former president of Harvard University, where he is currently University Professor. “Will the Center Hold?” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12?a_la=english&a_d=5a37edac78b6c709b8d260dd&a_m=&a_a=click&a_s=&a_p=%2Fsection%2Feconomics&a_li=recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12&a_pa=section-commentaries&a_ps>=.

The risk from a purely economic point of view is that the traditional strategy for battling recession – a reduction of 500 basis points in the federal funds rate – will be unavailable this year, given the zero lower bound on interest rates. Nor is it clear that the will or the room for fiscal expansion will exist.

This means that the next recession, like the last, may well be protracted and deep, with severe global consequences. And the political capacity for a global response, like that on display at the London G-20 Summit in 2009, appears to be absent as well. Just compare the global visions of US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown back then with those of Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May today.

I shudder to think what a serious recession will mean for politics and policy. It is hard to imagine avoiding a resurgence of protectionism, populism, and scapegoating. In such a scenario, as with another financial crisis, the center will not hold.

But the greatest risk in the next few years, I believe, is neither a market meltdown nor a recession. It is instead a political doom loop in which voters’ conclusion that government does not work effectively for them becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Candidates elected on platforms of resentment delegitimize the governments they lead, fueling further resentment and even more problematic new leaders. Cynicism pervades.

How else can one explain how the candidacy of Roy Moore for a US Senate seat? Moore, who was twice dismissed for cause from his post on the Alabama Supreme Court, and who is credibly charged with sexually assaulting teenage girls when he was in his 30s, could enter the US Senate as many of his colleagues look the other way.

If a country’s citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to improve their lives, the government has an incentive to rally popular support by focusing attention on threats that only it can address. That is why in societies pervaded by anger and uncertainty about the future, the temptation to stigmatize minority groups increases. And it is why there is a tendency for officials to magnify foreign threats.

We are seeing this phenomenon all over the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have all made nationalism a central part of their governing strategy. So, too, has Trump, who has explicitly rejected the international community in favor of the idea that there is only a ceaseless struggle among nation-states for competitive advantage.

When the world’s preeminent power, having upheld the idea of international community for nearly 75 years, rejects it in favor of ad hoc deal making, others have no choice but to follow suit. Countries that can no longer rely on the US feel pressure to provide for their own security. America’s adversaries inevitably will seek to fill the voids left behind as the US retrenches.

#### Extinction outweighs

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### Communalism focus risks replicating protofascist impulses and parochial hostility

Matthias Zick Varul 13. Sociology at the University of Exeter. “Towards a consumerist critique of capitalism: A socialist defence of consumer culture,” *Ephemera*, Vol. 13, No. 2, May 2013, p. 293-315.

**Note: Marcos is the former military leader and spokesperson of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation**

Any alternative to capitalism, if it is not to relapse into a frozen world in which everybody has their place, must find a functional equivalent to this alterity-facilitating function of consumer culture. Currently even the most radically left anti-consumerist movements seem to have a tendency to create island communities (e.g. Chatzidakis et al., 2012: 502) where, on the one hand, alternative forms of sociality can be lived among politically like-minded people, but where, on the other hand, a valuation of a sense of place translates into a borderline parochial hostility to mobility. Migration within a globalized world is viewed with suspicion. Subcommandante Marcos [whom Naomi Klein adopts as hero of the anti-consumerist movement, a universal avatar for he 'is simply us, we are the leader we've been looking for' (2002: 3)] speaks of the 'nightmare of migration', which 'continues to grow' (2001: 565). He is rightfully concerned about xenophobia and the marginalization of large groups of migrants, but anyone who knows a bit about migration will be troubled by the blanket notion of a 'nightmare'. More significantly, he adds the 'loss of cultural identity', a genuine conservative concern, as equally devastating as hunger and police repression. Such an attitude condemns people to their ethnic identities - while commoditization offers an exit:

Anti-modernists often bemoan that ethnic identities today are no longer 'authentic', but are rather superficial, made up of musical tropes and clothing styles and exaggerated gestures that aren't passed down from generation to generation, but chosen through the influence of the mass media. But it is precisely this commodification that allows people to choose elements from various cultural traditions and blend them into a new identity. The same process also makes it easier for people to stray from their 'original' identities - or in conventional terms, to integrate into society. Uncommodified ethnic identities are closed to outsider, and raise the costs for straying outside their walls: one either is or isn't. (Sznaider, 2000: 307)

Nobody knows that better than Subcommandante Marcos himself - hence his engagement in the literary market8.

Like all societies, capitalist societies are built on expectations and mutual obligations. But while traditional networks of obligations are first of all entangling webs of very specific normative expectations that can be negotiated only to a very limited extent, the capitalist economy entails an anonymization and generalization of obligation that allows us to be tied up in a very liberal way (Varul, 2010: 63). The need to earn money can be understood as generalized debt - we owe our existence to society and we need to pay off that debt somehow. According to David Graeber (2011) the ideology of indebtedness of the individual to society has a long history and is at the heart of the fact of domination. But while most other societies have clear ideas about what is owed by whom, in a liberal capitalist society we are neither told how to repay our debt (i.e. what to work at) nor to whom (i.e. who to work for - except, of course, taxes to government). We are not liberated from serfdom as such, but we are no longer tied to a particular master and our position of serfdom within society as a whole is sweetened by the reverse indebtedness of society to us - in the form of money as generalized bills of exchange. In a preview of his Debt: The first 5000 years, Graeber explores the moral implications that arise:

The true ethos of our individualistic society may be found in this equation: We all owe an infinite debt to humanity, nature, or the cosmos (however one prefers to frame it), but no one else can possibly tell us how to pay it. All systems of established authority - religion, morality, politics, economics, the criminal-justice system - are revealed to be fraudulent ways of calculating what cannot be calculated. Freedom, then, is the ability to decide for ourselves how to pay our debts. (Graeber, 2010)

Of course, Graeber (2011) sees any indebtedness as tied up in recurring relations of violence and violation, in which even the balanced reciprocities of the neighbourly exchanges of favours, gestures and attention (be it among the British people or the Tiv people) become a sinister symptom of repression. But in making his case, he cannot avoid emphasizing the universality of such relations of mutual indebtedness. Assuming we cannot do away with indebtedness as such (i.e. here I disagree with Graeber), the individualistic ethos looks like the best we can get. Whether such an individualistic ethos is something worth having at all is an open question. The authors of The coming insurrection (The Invisible Committee, 2007), for instance, start off by condemning this ethos (which they correctly identify as rooted in consumer culture), and in response conjure up a world of militant communes - a trajectory denounced by Johannes Thumfart (2010) as a leftist remake of antimodernist/protofascist ideologies such as those of Carl Schmitt. If, however, the individualistic ethos is to be preserved (which, obviously, is what I am arguing for here), change needs to be pursued through associationalist (as opposed to communalist) approaches to political action in which the individual is emphatically affirmed both in means and ends. And as part of this the new possibilities of collective action available in a consumer- capitalist society need to be recognized, as does the role of consumer choice in a socialist society as proposed by Douglas Jay:

Socialists have been inclined to depreciate the value of free consumers' choice for no better reason than that it has been used as a hypocritical defence of the unregulated price scramble. Complacent defenders of laissez-faire have emphasized the great importance of allowing the individual to spend his income as he likes, and have omitted to notice that he may have no income to spend. And socialists have rightly retorted that consumers' choice is of no more use to a man who is penniless than liberty to a man who is starving. Gross inequality, in fact, turns consumers' choice into a mockery. But may not the solution be to mitigate inequality rather than to abandon consumers' choice? (Jay, 1938/1947: 255-256)2NC

#### Even if growth is imperfect, the transition away fails

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” *Ecological Economics* 146: 157-63. Emory Libraries.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required.

It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an antimarket project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power.

Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23).

In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project.

The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent

It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project.

Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense.

Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this.

At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

#### Debate is distinct from academia---in that deliberation starts with the timer and ends with the ballot

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

## 2NC

### T

#### Antitrust law matters for every aspect of our lives, and debating the political details is essential to making it work.

Bryce Covert 20. Contributor at The Nation and a contributing op-ed writer at The New York Times, 11/30/20. “The Visible Hand.” https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/david-dayen-monopolized-review/

In the morning, I shower right after I wake up. I choose from a number of products to clean myself, yet they are made by just two companies: Unilever and Johnson & Johnson. I brush my teeth with a toothbrush and toothpaste made by Procter & Gamble but sold under the separate brands Oral-B and Crest. Before I eat breakfast, because I have Type 1 diabetes, I take insulin, a drug that, because of pharmaceutical consolidation and anticompetitive patent hoarding allowed to run amok, cost about $20 for a vial in 1996 but now costs $275. Lunch isn’t any better. The peanut butter for my sandwich almost certainly comes from one of three companies; same with the jelly. We all have “choices,” but do we really get to choose?

Once you put on your “monopoly decoder ring,” David Dayen writes in his new book Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power, you start to see how this power influences every part of our lives. There’s a baby formula monopoly: Three companies—Abbott Laboratories (which makes Similac), Reckitt Benckiser (which makes Enfamil), and Nestlé—control about 95 percent of the US market. It even follows us after our deaths: Service Corporation International keeps buying up funeral homes and now earns more than $1 out of every $5 in profit from funeral services, and two companies, Hillenbrand and Matthews, make 82 percent of the country’s coffins and caskets.

Some monopolies have become so obvious that everyone can spot them. If you want to fly anywhere in the United States, you basically have four choices, all of which offer increasingly bad service. If you want cable and Internet, you usually have only one or two high-cost options and no power to fight back when the company tells you a technician will be coming anywhere between 8 am and 8 pm to set it up. If you want to search for information or buy something on the Internet, there’s one choice for each that dominates all the rest: Google and Amazon.

But monopolies crop up in all sorts of unexpected places. Match Group, the parent company that owns Match.com, also owns OkCupid, Tinder, and Hinge. Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company empire of billionaire Warren Buffett, owns brands as diverse as Duracell, Dairy Queen, Benjamin Moore, and Fruit of the Loom. The coffee brands Caribou, Peet’s, Intelligentsia, and Stumptown are all owned or partly controlled by the European firm JAB.

Our country is saturated with monopolies, but some might ask, does it matter? As Dayen shows, monopolies make it harder for workers to wield power when there are fewer and fewer employers to choose from. They make the economy less dynamic and innovative. They make society less equal, and by amassing so many resources, they are able to amass power to protect those resources. Monopolies are even a threat to our very democracy, drowning out the voices of the people.

Worries about monopolies date as far back as AD 483. At the beginning of his book, Dayen quotes Emperor Zeno decreeing, “No one may presume to exercise a monopoly of any kind.” Going as far back as the railroad barons of the 19th century, Americans have worried about the ill effects of economic consolidation. Theodore Roosevelt famously took them on as a populist trustbuster. The Granger farmers’ movement and Progressive era activists fought monopolies.

Dayen mentions much of this history, but his aim is not simply to recount it or engage in the contemporary debates over the ways monopolies warp our economy and our society; instead, he wants to spark a modern movement through real, human stories. Corporate concentration and antitrust regulation can sound like dry issues. Dayen seeks to remind us of the very real consequences they have in our everyday lives.

The stories he tells can often be heartbreaking. There’s Travis Bornstein, whose son, Tyler Bornstein, died of a heroin overdose at 23 after getting hooked on opioids that were prescribed for his elbow surgery when he was 18. Rather than call an ambulance or take him to a hospital, the friend Tyler Bornstein was with when he overdosed dumped him in a vacant lot in Akron, Ohio, and fled. “You can’t prepare to lose a child,” Travis Bornstein tells Dayen. “I felt like I failed as a father.” But the Bornsteins were failed by the rampant cartelization and concentration in the pharmaceutical industry: Tyler Bornstein’s death is one of over 200,000 related to opioids since OxyContin, manufactured by one of the Big Pharma companies, was introduced in 1996.

OxyContin, Dayen insists, is just one stark example of the dangers in an industry in which, as he puts it, “monopolies at every stage of the supply chain placed their bottom lines ahead of the health of the recipients of those drugs.” For example, “If you have glaucoma, the reason liquid from your eye drops constantly rolls down your cheeks is that companies deliberately make the drop larger than the human eye can hold. Every milliliter that falls out of your eye represents a tiny profit, and it adds up.”

Dayen also introduces us to Chris Petersen, a third-generation hog farmer in Iowa whose farm has been so battered by agricultural monopolies that his daughter, who grew up aspiring to join the family business, had to find work at a hotel instead. After several generations of farmers, “I’m it,” he tells Dayen. “This is the dead end. You know, it’s sad.” It’s hard for Petersen to compete with concentrated animal feeding operations, which shove thousands of hogs into giant feedlots without sunlight and with scant room to move, whose cost cutting has sent hog prices plummeting. As Dayen notes, four hog firms control two-thirds of today’s market.

We also meet Kate Hanni, who, with her husband and two children, was stuck on a grounded American Airlines flight in 2006 for nine hours without food or water, watching mothers use barf bags for diapers and others puke into them as the smell of overflowing bathrooms wafted through the cabin. The airline refused to let passengers off because doing so would have cost it money through mandated refunds. One claustrophobic traveler even tried to flash SOS signs through the window with his cell phone.

One might wonder if this is an isolated incident. But the entire industry is dominated by just four major airlines, and as Dayen writes, “as long as passengers have nowhere else to go, there’s no incentive to fix a perpetually broken system,” one in which long flight delays are frequent and the service gets worse and worse.

In Dana Chisholm’s quest for an affordable rental house in Southern California, Dayen gives us a story of how monopolization in real estate is running rampant: Chisholm eventually rented from the private-equity-backed landlord Starwood Waypoint, one of several Wall Street real estate companies that have become huge players in the rental market. In 2017, Starwood Waypoint merged with Invitation Homes and is now the nation’s largest rental landlord. More than 240,000 US homes are now in the hands of investors, mostly private equity firms. Because they own so many properties, these companies can jack up rents and fees while slow-walking upkeep and repairs. For Chisholm, that meant appliances that didn’t work, no running water in the sink, and a building infested with rats and roaches. When she contacted the management company, she had to wait months for repairs before getting a Zillow alert for her own house: The management company had listed it for rent even though she had just paid up.

While the stories Dayen offers take place all across the country, from rural areas to Los Angeles’s urban sprawl, and involve people in very different communities and careers, they have the same nugget of truth at their heart: When companies are allowed to keep consolidating, people lose. Without robust regulation that keeps consolidation in check, corporations will keep laying waste to our economy and our lives.

Dayen wrote his book before the current health crisis but in many ways anticipated it. Concentrated supply chains are brittle and unable to cope with major disruptions, such as a pandemic that spikes demand for toilet paper and nose swabs alike. Meat-processing giants that squeeze out smaller players through aggressive line speeds and cost cutting are now major Covid-19 hot spots, thanks to a focus on the bottom line instead of higher safety standards and humane worker treatment. “Amazingly,” Dayen writes, “news deserts correlate with the spread of infectious diseases, as epidemiologists rely on local articles to track outbreaks.”

As Dayen convincingly shows, monopolies are so interwoven in our economy and our lives that there is no escape from them. But his book also highlights some of the challenges faced by a politics that is primarily focused on monopoly. If you see it everywhere without pausing to clarify what is anticompetitive behavior and what is just plain old greed, you risk having the concept lose its specific meaning.

Dayen points a finger at the tech monopolies Google and Facebook, for example, for ravaging the media industry by bleeding advertising dollars dry through their dominance of the market. But there are also other forces pummeling the industry: Wall Street ownership, fickle billionaire backers, and smaller publications’ struggle to find new sources of revenue. Meanwhile, the media industry itself is dotted with monopolies, such as News Corp, which owns The Wall Street Journal and the New York Post and dozens of other properties; TV conglomerates that control local news; and dominant talk radio brands. Later, in a chapter on private equity, we begin to see how the problem with its quest for acquisitions is not only that it shrinks competition but also that it shifts companies’ focus from the production and distribution of goods to the maximization of money for investors. Private equity has, for example, fed upon the retail sector and spit out discarded brands like Sears and Toys “R” Us. This parasitic relationship seems to be less about monopoly power than avarice and a lack of regulation. Certainly, private equity funds have bought up companies in a number of sectors, leading to consolidation. But that’s not what happened to these retailers: The hedge funds came in, loaded the companies with debt, got fat off the fees, and then let the companies fail.

Dayen says that his book’s ambition is not to rehash economic arguments made elsewhere but to turn those arguments into a movement. But a call to action has to be clearly defined. Likewise, as liberal and left politics in the past demonstrated, alongside anti-monopolist politics must be a program of strong social policies. Breaking up health insurance cartels, for example, will help lower costs, but it won’t ensure health care for all. Anti-monopolism must define its potential and its limits and be married to other policy interventions.

There is a compelling reason to focus on anti-monopolist politics, which has garnered bipartisan support over the years. In Tennessee, Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike have tried to get rid of state limitations on municipal broadband service that were imposed at the behest of telecom giants. “We’re aligned on this issue, because it’s not theoretical, it’s practical,” says Chattanooga Mayor Andy Berke, a Democrat. “I’m a small-c conservative,” Christopher Mitchell, a researcher at the Institute for Local Self Reliance, tells Dayen. “The idea of a family moving because they lack broadband is devastating.” Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib stood with Freedom Caucus leaders Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows in demanding that a military contract monopolist return over $16 million in excess funds that it was able to squeeze out of the government. But it is where bipartisan support ends—on matters of redistribution and universal programs—that the lines are drawn between those seeking economic justice for all and those seeking merely a less tilted field.

One reason anti-monopolism is so popular among a certain set is that the solutions to monopoly power are easy to find. In fact, we often don’t need anything new. “We know how to handle monopolies,” Dayen points out, citing existing laws that can protect us against antitrust abuses but that have been misinterpreted or watered down. To him, this should be at the center of any anti-monopolist movement: restoring these laws with their original power and using them to break up monopolies, block mergers that create future ones, and regulate any that remain as public utilities. That’s all “entirely possible under existing law,” he adds.

The institutions are also in place, and not just in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (which are supposed to police monopolies and bust trusts). The Federal Communications Commission is supposed to ensure universal, high-speed Internet access under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Civil Aeronautics Board, created in 1938, used to keep airlines from getting concentrated while ensuring widespread access to travel.

But if this is all a matter of laws and regulatory bodies doing the jobs they were given, then why aren’t they? Here Dayen looks to the underlying politics of monopolization. “The mechanisms are clear,” he writes, but “getting the political class to enforce them is the stumbling block.”

#### It’s key to understanding the fault lines of capitalism.

Katie Wilson 20. General Secretary of the Transit Riders Union, a Seattle-based organization advocating for improved public transit and other progressive urban issues. She is a contributing columnist covering local politics, economics and urbanism, 10/28/20. “Capitalism, competition, and why antitrust is so confusing.” https://crosscut.com/opinion/2020/10/capitalism-competition-and-why-antitrust-so-confusing

Such an extreme concentration of economic power in the hands of one corporation raises urgent questions about the health of our economy and our democracy. As I wrote last week, Congress is beginning to ask those questions. As denizens of a region transformed by Amazon’s rise, we’d all do well to ask them, too, and that means wrapping our heads around “antitrust” — the area of public policy and law intended to address the perils of excessive corporate power. It’s a tricky subject, and not merely because antitrust, like any corner of the law, has its share of intricacies, arcane terminology and subtle disputes. It’s also confusing because antitrust lies at one of the fault lines where the ideology of the capitalist marketplace begins to self-destruct.

### Case

#### “Bringing the dead back” is ridiculous

Myers 9—Associate Professor of biology at the University of Minnesota [Paul, “The dead are dead,” 10 Dec 2009, http://tinyurl.com/jxjrtsp, accessed 17 Jul 2016]

One of the most important tools for promulgating religion is fear, and one of the biggest sources of fear is the inescapable fact of personal mortality: we’re all going to die someday, and we all know people we’ve loved who have died. Religion steps up to the challenge of death in its usual glib and dishonest way, and promises a mysterious “afterlife,” in which you’ll get to go on being you despite the inconvenience of your flesh rotting away. None of the proponents of this belief have the slightest scrap of evidence for their claims, other than an appeal to emotion and desire, and sometimes some really bad experiments and sloppy observations of phenomena that vanish when a little rigor is applied.

Usually, the defense of belief in an afterlife falls along a couple of lines. One is the absence of a defense; you really want to live forever, so go ahead, simply believe this claim of immortality. It’s easy! Most religions simply do that, assert with no evidence but a hefty demand that you take the story on faith…which the believers have no difficulty providing.

The other strategy is to claim evidence while not having any. Without exception, this approach is appallingly stupid; I have never read anyone claiming to have solid evidence of life after death who fails to provide a train of fallacies and distortions. And if you want appallingly stupid fallacies, there is one man you can always turn to to provide: Dinesh D’Souza. He recently took part in an interview in which he defended the notion of a Christian afterlife.

Kengor: If there is life after death, how do we know that the Christian view of the afterlife is the correct one?

D’Souza: One way is to test a uniquely Christian claim: Remember that while all the religions of the world say there is life after death, only one religion says that it has actually happened. Jews and Muslims, for example, believe that there is a resurrection at the end of the world. But Christianity asserts that its founder, Jesus Christ, died and came back to life. No other religion claims that its founder–say Moses or Muhammad–physically returned from the dead. In one of the later chapters of my book, I examine the resurrection as a historical event. I take the facts that the vast majority of historians would accept–the fact that Christ lived and preached, that he made enemies, that his enemies killed him, that he was buried in a tomb, that his disciples claim to have found the tomb empty, that they said Jesus appeared before them several times after his crucifixion, and that this event filled them with conviction and propelled a movement of conversion that was sustained even in the face of Roman persecution and resistance. So these are the facts, and how do we account for them? If the resurrection stands up to historical scrutiny, if it is an historical event by the standards of historical verification, then the Christian view of the afterlife rises above the pack. It is the one to take seriously.

Wow. He’s making a historical argument while clearly utterly ignorant of the history. Resurrections and visits to the afterlife are practically staples of just about every religion. Osiris was killed, chopped into pieces, and resurrected, yet this is not evidence that the Egyptian pantheon existed. Gilgamesh made a visit to the underworld and returned to report on its existence and conditions, but we aren’t worshipping a mob of Mesopotamian deities now. How can anyone claim that Christianity is unique in having a dead god returning to life when it’s a standard feature of many old pagan religions?

The resurrection of Jesus is not a reasonable historical event. There are no primary, contemporary accounts of his existence. The books of the Bible that describe him were written decades after the purported event, and most of the biblical accounts are second-, third-, or distant-hand hearsay written by people with a vested interest in promoting a religion. The accounts we do have are inconsistent or contradictory, or inconsistent and contradictory. By the standards of historical verification, Jesus and his miraculous resurrection are myths. Nothing more. Maybe something less.

This is the kind of idiocy we’ve all come to expect from D’Souza. Another tactic that believers resort to, other than pseudohistory, is pseudoscience. This is remarkably popular, especially among the New Agey set, and the usual science that gets mangled is physics. The quantum is usually involved, too. I’m sure he wouldn’t want to be an exception, so when Robert Lanza asks in the Huffington Post (you already know what kind of fluff you’re going to get from the information given just this far), “Does Death Exist? New Theory Says ‘No’“, you can count on yet more nonsense.

#### They make debates about “how to live within a hostile world” which abandons the possibility of changing material inequality

Torrant 14 – Professor of English at SUNY Albany and Kingsborough Community College (Julie, “It Is Time To Give Up Liberal, Bourgeois Theories, Including New Materialist Feminism, And Take Up Historical Materialist Feminism For The 21st Century,” http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2014/historicalmaterialistfeminismforthe21stcentury.htm] Winter/Spring)

Recently, there has been a turn away from textualist and culturalist theory in feminism and the emergence of "new" materialist feminisms. Represented by the work of Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and others, this turn in theory has come in response to the deepening inequalities and crises of capitalism that are having profound effects on women worldwide — material problems outside the text and not resolvable by a change in cultural values. While it is important to see that the new materialist feminisms are responses to real problems, it is equally important to understand how these materialisms are limited by their conceptualization of the material. The new materialist feminisms are actually disenabling for feminism in that they are forms of spiritualism which displace critique with strategies of enchanted affective adaptation and survival and thus dismantle materialist feminism's primary conceptual tool for social transformation. To avoid merely reproducing sophisticated forms of the survivalism and "prepperism" that have emerged as individualistic coping responses to economic crisis and austerity, I argue that feminism needs to return to historical materialism in the tradition of Marx, Engels and Kollontai to understand social life in terms of its root relations and aid in the struggles to bring about social transformation. Exemplary of the new materialist feminism is Rosi Braidotti's writing on "the politics of 'life itself'," a theory which she organizes around the trope of "sustainability." Sustainability, a concept in ecology for living within natural limits, becomes in these writings a means of reconceiving the historical social relations of capitalism as if they were the unchangeable, underlying existential limit-situation of "life itself." The politics of "life itself" and the new materialist focus on seeking a sustainable feminism within this new, more "realist" approach to material reality, is a form of feminist theory and politics which is ultimately the already familiar theory and politics of reparative reading. Why is this significant? As Ellis Hanson suggests in a review of Sedgwick, "Faced with the depressing realization that people are fragile and the world hostile, a reparative reading focuses not on the exposure of political outrages that we already know but rather on the process of reconstructing a sustainable life in their wake" (105). In other words, reparative analysis begins not with critique of the so-called already known and presumably known to be unchangeable, but by focusing on how to live within the already-known-to-be hostile world. Such a theory of the social begins and ends by reducing knowledge to a matter of how to cope, how to feel, how to exist, etc. within what is taken to be unchangeable. The effect of this focus on "sustainability" within hostility is that social transformation — which requires the production of knowledge of what needs to be transformed — is treated as impossible. Abandoning the project of transformation, I argue, is a sign of the way dominant "materialist" feminism — under the guise of "new materialism"— has increasingly abandoned the project of women's emancipation from exploitation, and in the interests of capital instead translates austerity measures into a theoretical discourse of getting by on less.

#### focus on survival depoliticizes resistance by playing into the conservative ideology of individual achievement

Giroux 3 – McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest (Henry A., “Pedagogies of Difference, Race, and Representation: Film as a Site of Translation and Politics,” in Pedagogies of Difference: Rethinking Education for Social Change, edited by Peter Trifonas, p95-96)

Any attempt to address Baby Boy as a form of public pedagogy would have to analyze the largely privatized and individualized analysis that shapes this film and how it resonates with the ongoing privatization and depoliticization of the public sphere. As neoliberalism has gained momentum since the 1980s, one of its distinguishing features has been an assault on all those public spheres that are not regulated by the language of the market. Under the onslaught of neoliberal ideology and its tum toward free market as the basis for human interaction, there is an attempt to alter radically the very vocabulary we use in describing and appraising human interest, action, and behavior. Individuals are now defined largely as consumers, and self-interest appears to be the only factor capable of motivating people. Public spaces are increasingly displaced by commercial interests, and private utopias become the only way of understanding the meaning of the good life. It gets worse. As public life is emptied of its own separate concerns -importance of public goods, civic virtue, public debate, collective agency, and social provisions for the marginalized-it becomes increasingly more difficult to translate private concerns into public considerations. The Darwinian world of universal struggle pits individuals against each other while suggesting that the misfortunes and problems of others represent both a weakness of character and a social liability. Within such a system, the state gives up its obligations to provide collective safety nets for people and the ideology of going it alone furthers the myth that all social problems are the result of individual choices. Unfortunately, Baby Boy not only refuses to challenge the myth of individual motivation and pathology as the source of unemployment, violence, welfare dependency, bad housing, inadequate schools, and crumbling infrastructures, it actually reinforces this well rehearsed stable of conservative ideology. It does so by suggesting that collective problems can only be addressed as tales of individual survival, coming of age stories that chronicle either selfishness, laziness, and lack of maturity or individual perseverance. By suggesting that Jody 's life is colonized by the private, cut off from larger social, economic, and political issues, Baby Boy both renders hope private and suggests that communities in struggle can only share or be organized around the most private of intimacies,

**[Marked]**

removed in large part from the capacity to struggle over broader issues. Dependency in this film is a dirty word, and seems to ignore the ways in which it resonates with right wing attacks on the welfare state and the alleged perils of big government. Granted, Baby Boy is supposedly about the refusal of immature African-American youth to grow up, but the film 's attack on dependency is so one-sided that it reinforces the myth that social safety nets simply weaken character, and it supports this ideology, in part, by refusing to acknowledge how dependency on the welfare state has worked for those millions for whom it has "made all the difference between wretched poverty and a decent life."41 Similarly, if Jody 's dreams are limited to the demands of the traditional family structure and the successes associated with the market ideology, there is no room in Baby Boy to recognize democracy, not the market, as a force of dissent and a relentless critique of institutions, as a source of civic engagement, or as a discourse for expanding and deepening the possibilities of critical citizenship and social transformation. In the end, Baby Boy fails to offer a space for translating how the private and public mutually inform each other; consequently, it reinforces rather than ruptures those racially oppressive trends in American society that disfigure the possibility of racial justice, democratic politics, and responsible citizenship.

## 1NR

### Case

#### Capitalism solves poverty---economic freedom increases living standards and reduces poverty

Luka Ladan 19. Luka Ladan is the President and CEO of Zenica Public Relations and a Catalyst Policy Fellow. Prior to founding Zenica, Ladan served as Communications Director at a leading public affairs firm in Washington, D.C. "Capitalism Remains the Best Way to Combat Extreme Poverty." Catalyst. 6-14-2019. <https://catalyst.independent.org/2019/06/14/capitalism-remains-the-best-way-to-combat-extreme-poverty/>

More recent research paints a much rosier picture. According to a [May 2019 study](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/5/18650492/2019-poverty-2-dollar-a-day-edin-shaefer-meyer) co-authored by University of Chicago professors and Census Bureau researchers, the American experiment may not be perfect, but extreme poverty remains a statistical anomaly. Specifically analyzing $2-a-day poverty—that is, the number of Americans living on $2 or less per day—the study’s co-authors found that only 0.11 percent of Americans live in extreme poverty. That comes out to [roughly 336,000 people](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/5/18650492/2019-poverty-2-dollar-a-day-edin-shaefer-meyer)—still too high, but nowhere near 18 million. Moreover, the study concludes that the extreme poverty rate for parents—whether single or married—is virtually zero. Again, America is not perfect. Poverty lingers, even here. But the status quo could be a whole lot worse: It may be difficult to become a member of the top “one percent,” but it is even harder to fall into extreme poverty. The good fortunes of most can be traced to the free exchange of goods and services for mutual gain. While an imperfect system, **capitalism remains our most effective weapon in fighting extreme poverty. As we’ve seen across continents, the freer an economy becomes, the less likely its people are to become entrapped in extreme poverty.** This can be corroborated by tracking the rise of “economic freedom,” which is related to the openness of a country’s markets and corresponding increases in living standards. Over the past 25 years, the global average economic freedom score—as calculated by the right-leaning Heritage Foundation—has [increased by 3.2 percentage points](https://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-1), with many countries joining the ranks of at least the “moderately free.” Indeed, global economic freedom has experienced a nearly six percent increase since 1995—after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Capitalism is more commonplace now than ever before. And how have extreme poverty rates fared in that time? Trending down—way down. During the early 1980s, [more than 42 percent of the world’s population](https://www.economist.com/international/2017/03/30/the-world-has-made-great-progress-in-eradicating-extreme-poverty) lived in extreme poverty (earning less than $2 a day). In the Soviet Union, for example, 20 percent of the population—over 43 million people—lived on less than 75 rubles a month (roughly $120). **Fast forward to the 21st century, and less than 10 percent of the world’s population is extremely poor—a 33 percent decrease. The left-leaning Brookings Institution** [**estimates**](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/11/07/global-poverty-is-declining-but-not-fast-enough/) **that someone escapes extreme poverty every 1.2 seconds.** Consider it this way: Even though the world’s population has increased by more than two billion people since 1990, the net number of extremely poor people has been slashed by nearly 1.2 billion. **In today’s era of globalization, about 130,000 people rise out of poverty every single day. That’s like the** [**entire city of New Haven, Connecticut**](https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newhavencityconnecticut) **leaving extreme poverty in a day’s time.** Or take China, which has opened many sectors of its economy in recent decades. Since 1995 alone, the Asian country’s economic freedom score [increased from 52 to 58.4 points](https://www.heritage.org/index/visualize)—outpacing the rest of the world. In roughly that same period of time, the Chinese economy [lifted 800 million people out of extreme poverty](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/14/WS5c89b8dea3106c65c34ee93a.html). That’s right: 800 million Chinese people—nearly three times the U.S. population. While still far from a “free economy,” China’s newfound openness to free-market principles is correlated with the most substantial example of poverty reduction in the history of the world. Even if correlation does not always equal causation, that accomplishment is difficult to ignore. Granting people the freedom to voluntarily make mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services has been the most effective anti-poverty solution to date. As more of the world allows the exercise of such freedom, expect poverty to decline even further. Capitalism boosts everyone’s quality of life---less infant mortality, longer life expectancies, and greater wealth. James Pethokoukis 16. James Pethokoukis, a columnist and an economic policy analyst, is the Dewitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he writes and edits the AEIdeas blog and hosts a weekly podcast, “Political Economy with James Pethokoukis.” He is also a columnist for The Week and an official contributor to CNBC. "Don't tell Bernie Sanders, but capitalism has made human life fantastically better. Here's how." American Enterprise Institute - AEI. 2-9-2016. https://www.aei.org/economics/political-economy/dont-tell-bernie-sanders-but-capitalism-has-made-human-life-fantastically-better-heres-how/ Top of Form

Bottom of Form

Back in 1995, now-Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders said, “I personally happen not to be a great believer in the free enterprise system for many reasons.” And having watched Sanders during this primary season, it doesn’t appear to me that the self-described democratic socialist has much changed his opinion of capitalism. Which is both amazing and appalling. The [single greatest story of human achievement](https://www.aei.org/publication/the-most-important-economic-chart-in-western-civilization-and-how-it-happened/) of the past 2,000 years is the dramatic rise in living standards of the past 200 years. It’s an astounding ascent — see above chart — driven by innovative, entrepreneurial capitalism. Free enterprise. Economic freedom. Yes, workers in advanced economies today are many multiples wealthier — almost incalculably so — than their counterparts in the early 19th century. But here is another way of looking at, thanks to [a new study](http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/finance/articles/technology-and-people.html) by consultancy Deloitte showing how technology-driving innovation has radically altered lives in Britain for the much better: 1) Technology has created more jobs than it has destroyed in the last 144 years. 2) It has been saving us from dull, repetitive, and dangerous work. Agriculture was the first major sector to experience this change. In 1871 it employed 6.6% of the workforce of England and Wales. Today that stands at 0.2%, a 95% decline. 3) Overall, technological innovation has resulted in fewer humans being deployed as sources of muscle power and more engaged in jobs involving the nursing and care of others. Just 1.1% of the workforce was employed in the caring professions during the 1871 census. By 2011, these professions employed almost a quarter of the England and Wales workforce. 4) Technology has boosted employment in knowledge-intensive sectors such as medicine, accounting and professional services. 5) Finally technology has lowered the cost of essentials, raising disposable incomes and creating new demand and jobs. In 1871, there was one hairdresser for every 1,793 English and Welsh citizens; now there is one for every 287. In 1948, a Freed-Eiseman 16-inch TV cost $795 in the US, roughly a quarter of the average annual salary, or roughly $12,000 today. A top of the range TV can be bought today for less than $1,000. On a quality-adjusted basis, the decline in prices is even more pronounced. US CPI data show that the price of a TV has fallen by 98% since 1950. So thanks to the technology-driven innovation of entrepreneurial capitalism, we live richer, fuller lives that would be unimaginable to workers in the early 1800s or even later 1800s. Economist Robert Gordon describes the “special century” after 1870 in his new book, [“The Rise and Fall of American Growth”](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjAn_y5ouvKAhVJ2R4KHawYDVEQFgglMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FThe-Rise-Fall-American-Growth%2Fdp%2F0691147728&usg=AFQjCNGv_GdG6g6GfLCmyWJHwLvjcwtBJQ&sig2=YDvTawzJBjWCZEXtpUROEg&bvm=bv.113943665,d.dmo) as “more important to economic progress than have been all other centuries.” Or as [my colleague Michael Strain](https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/21/why-we-need-economic-growth-more-than-we-need-democratic-socialism/) has written: Over the past two centuries, growth has increased living standards in the West unimaginably quickly. Many more babies survive to adulthood. Many more adults survive to old age. Many more people can be fed, clothed and housed. Much of the world enjoys significant quantities of leisure time. Much of the world can carve out decades of their lives for education, skill development and the moral formation and enlightenment that come with it. Growth has enabled this. Let’s keep growing. **Growth facilitates the flourishing life**. By creating a dynamic environment characterized by increasing opportunity, growth gives the young the opportunity to dream and to strive. And it gives the rest of us the ability to apply our skills and talents as we see fit, to contribute to society, to provide for our families. A growing economy allows individuals to increase their living standards, facilitating economic and social mobility. How could anyone not be a great believer in competitive, market-driven capitalism?

#### decline exacerbates their impacts---nuclear war is a net-worse way to die

Thompson 18 – (Nicole Akoukou Thompson. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR. http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#)

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations. This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear ~~holocaust~~ strike sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country. Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false. “The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas. Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated: African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

#### Decreased Big Tech enforcement now---courts interpret antitrust narrowly.

Jennifer Saba and Gina Chon 7-21. Reporters for Reuters covering Antitrust. Breakdown: U.S. antitrust frenzy stops with judges. Reuters. 7-21-2021. https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/breakdown-us-antitrust-frenzy-stops-with-judges-2021-07-21/

COMPANIES WIN CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME IN COURTS

If a firm wants to fight, it can turn to federal courts, where judges have often taken a narrow view of rules in a way that favors companies. For example, the burden of proof is on the government to show an acquisition target is a significant rival or that a deal will substantially reduce competition. This has tripped up many high-profile cases, including some recently. In 2019, the Justice Department lost an appeal to block the $85 billion tie-up between AT&T (T.N) and Time Warner. A judge recently dismissed the FTC’s suit against Facebook saying the agency failed to prove its case.

To avoid wasted time and resources, and potential embarrassment, the two federal agencies take on a small sliver of transactions. For the year ending Sept. 30, 2019, the FTC and DOJ challenged just 38 mergers of the more than 2,000 transactions that were reported. And a more aggressive approach by watchdogs hasn’t changed judges’ minds.

#### Courts are against enforcement now---“big is bad” is a fantasy.

Matt Rosoff 5-27. Editorial director of technology coverage at CNBC . Op-ed: This week showed how the Big Tech antitrust campaign is totally misguided. CNBC. 5-27-2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/op-ed-antitrust-crusade-against-big-tech-is-misguided.html

Washington D.C. and many tech industry gadflies live in a fantasy world when it comes to big technology companies.

In this fantasy world, the tech industry is completely dominated by four massive companies: Alphabet (Google’s holding company), Amazon, Apple and Facebook. Some folks have begun to throw Microsoft into the mix as well, given that they’re the second-most valuable company in the world -- and big is bad, according to this point of view.

These companies have stifled innovation, curbed opportunities, hurt consumers and harmed society. The only way to curb their harms is to stretch the definition of antitrust to fit these companies’ specific circumstances, then use these newfound antitrust violations to impose fines and behavioral remedies, and to unwind past acquisitions. To this end, a congressional subcommittee last week pushed six separate tech antitrust bills through markup, setting the stage for one or more of them to become law.

This week’s events should deliver a cold splash of reality to advocates for this point of view.

On Monday, a district judge threw out antitrust complaints that the FTC and 48 state attorneys general brought against Facebook. U.S. District Judge James Boasberg, in an opinion laced with withering sarcasm, didn’t just dismiss the FTC’s complaint on a technicality or ruling of law -- he undercut the cornerstone of the argument by ruling the FTC did not prove Facebook had a monopoly or market power.

“The FTC’s Complaint says almost nothing concrete on the key question of how much power Facebook actually had, and still has, in a properly defined antitrust product market,” the filing reads. “It is almost as if the agency expects the Court to simply nod to the conventional wisdom that Facebook is a monopolist.”

#### Even semantic tweaks kill business dynamism and investments.

Adam Thierer 2-25. senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University . Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer. TheHill. 2-25-2021. https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/540391-open-ended-antitrust-is-an-innovation-killer

Unfortunately, the calls for more bureaucracy and regulation emanating from all corners of the political world could have an unintended consequence: discouraging the sort of vibrant innovation and consumer choice that made America’s tech companies household names across the globe.

Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) is leading one charge. Klobuchar, who chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, recently introduced the “Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act.” This sweeping measure seeks to expand the powers and budgets of antitrust regulators at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. It also includes new filing requirements and potentially hefty civil fines.

The most important feature is the proposed change to the legal standard by which regulators approve business deals. It would allow the government to stop any deal that creates an “appreciable risk of materially lessening competition,” and it also defines exclusionary behavior as, “conduct that materially disadvantages one or more actual or potential competitors.”

These may sound like simple, semantic tweaks, but – much like some of the other policy ideas currently circulating – they would upend decades of settled law and create a sea change in U.S. antitrust enforcement. This change could undermine business dynamism, innovation and investment in ways that inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses.

#### we are anti-CCP not anti-Asian---there’s a distinction

Josh Rogin 21. Columnist covering foreign policy and national security. George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo "Opinion: The United States must confront the Chinese Communist Party and racism at the same time". Washington Post. 3-25-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-confront-the-chinese-communist-party-and-racism-at-the-same-time/2021/03/25/63fe8308-8d9c-11eb-9423-04079921c915\_story.html

The United States must compete with China and confront the Chinese government on a range of issues while simultaneously combating the rise of anti-Asian racism at home. These two missions are not at odds with each other, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have you believe. In fact, they must go hand in hand.

In Alaska last weekend, Chinese government leaders sought to stoke our country’s racial divisions, accusing the United States of having “slaughtered” African Americans, to deflect criticism over Beijing’s mass atrocities against its Uyghur Muslim population. Meanwhile, CCP propaganda outlets have been using the killing last week in the Atlanta area of eight innocent people (six of them Asian) to cast aspersions on those who are condemning the Chinese government’s atrocities. Beijing’s goal is to conflate and confuse two related but distinct issues: challenging the Chinese government and the need to fight racism in the United States. But their gambit amounts to presenting a false choice between doing one or the other.

“It is part of a broader strategy that the Chinese Communist Party is enacting to undermine our democracy,” Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla.) told me in an interview. “So when you see them creating that false equivalency . . . it is their way to sow discord in our society, because they understand when we are not united, we are weaker in leading the world in confronting their bad behavior.”

Murphy, a former Pentagon official who came to the United States as a child refugee from Vietnam, said that the use of racist language by former president Donald Trump and other GOP officials plays into the CCP’s hands. Yet at the same she emphasized that U.S. leaders have to be able to speak honestly and critically about the CCP’s negative behaviors, including its mishandling of the covid-19 pandemic.

The rise of racism against Asian Americans not only hurts the United States’ ability to deal with China, but also it harms efforts to make common cause with our regional allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Those governments’ ability to join the United States in confronting China is hurt when members of their diaspora communities are mistreated in the United States.

“We have to be able to make a very clear distinction that our adversary and competitor is the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people, and certainly not the Asian Americans who live here and who have contributed so much to this country,” Murphy said. “When we attack Americans of Asian descent, we attack ourselves.”

Some American commentators argue that the effort to confront the Chinese government’s behavior has fueled the staggering rise in hate and violence directed at Asians and Asian Americans in the United States. It’s certainly true that Trump’s racist rhetoric regarding the coronavirus fueled hate and conflated the two issues, tragically. And U.S. government efforts to confront CCP influence operations in our country have at times unfairly targeted people of Chinese origins.

Such targeting of Asians and Asian Americans makes us weaker at home and abroad. We must learn from, not repeat, examples from history when U.S. foreign policy negatively affected American minorities, including the mass internment of U.S. citizens and noncitizens of Japanese descent during World War II and the mistreatment of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11.

Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), the son of Indian immigrants, told me that the United States has to out-compete China without replicating the paradigms of the Cold War. But, he said, we must also stand up to the authoritarian and repressive model the Chinese government is putting forward without ceding our moral authority.

“That has to be the balance, enhance America’s strategic interest but clearly reject provocative rhetoric that’s intended to play to a base,” he said. “There’s a way to frame our moral position as a liberal democracy . . . without coming off as demonizing an entire civilization in a way that hurts Chinese or Chinese Americans.”

Khanna and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) have co-sponsored a bill, the Endless Frontier Act, to revamp the National Science Foundation to try to out-compete China through technological innovation. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Todd C. Young (R-Ind.) are cooperating on companion legislation in the Senate. These efforts will be a major test of whether bipartisan cooperation on the China challenge is possible.

It’s not the drive to confront China that is fueling hate and racism against Asians in America. Political opportunists are abusing that effort by fueling bigotry to score political points. This makes a unified strategy to confront the Chinese government only more difficult to achieve. In fact, addressing racism at home is crucial to winning the competition with China in the long run.

“We have to be aggressive in our policies and working with our allies to combat the violations the Chinese are making, but at the same time, we can hold the CCP accountable without scapegoating Asian Americans,” Murphy said. “And we have a responsibility to do that.”

#### The K of China Threat Rhetoric is a self-fulfilling propaganda that plays into violent Chinese nationalism

David Martin Jones 14. Professor of Politics at the University of Glasgow. "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen Incident" Australian Journal of Political. Vol. 49, No. 1. 2-21-14. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2013.878897?journalCode=cajp20

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). This is a large claim. Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to

democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18). Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property. It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations. Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady: 6).

#### Unipolarity solves interventions by providing the US with the freedom of action to avoid ill-advised fights. BUT retrenchment causes prolif of proxy conflicts and adventurism.

Noel Thomas Anderson 19. Assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. “Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War.” International Studies Quarterly 63(3): 692-706.

Systemic Dimensions: The Varying Prevalence of Competitive Intervention

The framework articulated above not only provides a comprehensive account of the duration effects of competitive intervention on civil wars—it also highlights a candidate explanation for the recent decline in the prevalence of intrastate conflict. Insofar as state decisions to aid combatants are consistent with competitive state policy-making, temporal variation in geopolitical competition between states should affect trends in the prevalence of competitive intervention. Variation in the prevalence of competitive intervention should in turn affect temporal trends in the prevalence of internal conflict through the duration effects described above.

Consider the pervasiveness of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. Bipolarity extended the geographic scope of concern and broadened the range of factors included in the competition between the superpowers. American and Soviet leaders worried that challenges to the existing distribution of power might raise doubts about the credibility of their alliance commitments, thereby encouraging their allies to drift toward neutrality or, worse still, switch sides (Hironaka 2005, 107–11). Because challenges to the status quo were perceived to threaten the relative balance of power and credibility, they were resisted. Yet, because any action by one superpower was perceived as an attempt to gain a geostrategic advantage, it demanded a response. The end result was a proliferation of US-Soviet competitive intervention, wherein the superpowers committed resources to opposing government and rebel forces fighting on the periphery of their spheres of influence.

That many civil wars during the Cold War were superpower proxy wars is a well-rehearsed perspective, but what is missing from existing accounts is an explanation for why superpower sponsorship should be associated with longer conflicts. If foreign civil wars played such a key role in the larger Cold War struggle, why did the superpowers not do what was necessary to help their respective sides win? The theory outlined above provides an answer: challenges to the relative balance of power and credibility necessitated reflexive responses, but the impossible stakes of direct confrontation advised caution. While the superpowers were compelled to intervene, they were simultaneously—and paradoxically—compelled to do so with restraint.

Superpower rivalry also had secondary duration effects. Constrained by the need to both deter and avoid direct confrontation, Washington and Moscow employed indirect strategies for projecting power. Military aid was an integral element of their competition for influence, and accordingly, money and weapons diffused not only to civil wars, but across the international system. This assistance empowered client states, providing a set of Cold War framings and superpower arms that could be used to justify and implement independent foreign policy objectives. Notably, the superpowers struggled to control their clients’ adventurism; by exploiting fears of defection to the opposing bloc, clients found ways to commandeer superpower aid for their own self-interested ends (Krause 1991). The net result was a proliferation of interventions by otherwise weak states in civil wars across the globe.

In the post–Cold War period, by contrast, state clients have a harder time garnering American aid. Regional powers continue to intervene in civil wars, but they can no longer rely on the reflexive support of the USSR when conflicts of interest arise vis-à-vis US policy, nor can they threaten defection to the Soviet-bloc in the face of American sanction. In the unipolar period, the United States has greater choice in which state clients it chooses to support, enjoys greater flexibility to discipline adventurism by weaker powers, and maintains “command of the commons” to restrict flows of economic and military aid around the globe (Posen 2003). Together, these features of the unipolar system constrain foreign adventurism by lesser powers relative to the Cold War period, thereby reducing—though not eliminating—the prevalence of competitive interventions among neighboring states and regional rivals. In this way, the transition from a bipolar to unipolar system not only terminated superpower proxy warfare, but also decreased the rate of competitive intervention by lesser powers.

#### Decline ensures transition wars---the US could launch a pre-emptive attack or China could strike first

Min-hyung Kim 20. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” Emerald Insight. 02-04-2019. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html>

Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that **war is likely** when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is **declining** and that a dissatisfied rising challenger **substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself**. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and **initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself** (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically **by a hegemonic war** (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the **growing Sino–US competition** over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “**preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat**

**[Marked]**

posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future **sees war as a better option** than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.

#### IR scholarship regarding the liberal order is not irredeemably racist

Gideon Rose 16, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of international relations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the extensive mainstream scholarship of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance.

These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—as opposed to straightforward great-power relations—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions.

Vitalis is less convincing, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone its contemporary incarnation. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago.

Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed eroded. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and patterns of domination Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its halting and inconsistent implementation.